We study the problem of combined pricing, resource allocation, and overbooking by service providers involved in dynamic non-cooperative oligopolistic competition on a network that represents the relationships of the providers to one another and to their customers when service demand is uncertain. We propose, analyze and compute solutions for a model that is more general than other models reported in the revenue management (RM) literature to date. In particular previous models typically consider only three or four of …ve key RM features that we have purposely built into our model: (1) pricing, (2) resource allocation, (3) dynamic competition, (4) an explicit network, and (5) uncertain demand. Illustrative realizations of the abstract problem we study are those of airline revenue management and service provision by companies facing resource constraints. Under fairly general regularity conditions, we prove existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for dynamic oligopolistic service network competition described by our model. We also show, again for an appropriate notion of regularity, that competition leads to the under-pricing of network services. We are able to numerically quantify the under-pricing gap for an illustrative example problem of intermediate size. Our proposed algorithm is shown to be implementable using well-known o¤-the-shelf commercial software.
f l using the expression (same as the eqn (4) of the main paper)
we have
The last inequality is obtained as the pdf f ( ) 0, a ij is either 0 or 1. This concludes the …rst part of the proof.
where a ij = 1 if service i utilizes resource j and 0 otherwise. Let F 1 1 +
; and dy dp
Using the de…nition of generalized failure rate (y) = 
Hence the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4. We observe that the Hamiltonian is separable, i.e.,
and H i f;t depends only on p f i;t for given non-own prices p f t and own shadow prices f of resources. Thus
Taking partials of H i f;t w.r.t. p f i;t for some i 2 S we obtain
where e f i;t is the local price elasticity. Next, we observe
and
0 (from item 7 of assumption A2)
Proof of Lemma 5. We have seen in Lemma 4 that for a given f (thus c f ) the game is supermodular. In addition, if we are able to show that H f;t has increasing di¤erences in p f t ; c f for each p f t ; we can use Theorem 6 to establish that the extremal equilibria of the revenue optimization game are increasing functions of rhe shadow price of resources, f . Di¤erentiating H f;t by c f j we obtain
Di¤erentiating again (9) w.r.t. service prices we observe @ 2 H f;t
. @c 
where e f i;t is the local price elasticity. Let us de…ne 
where (y) is a generalized failure rate. Now consider
where it is evident that (0) = 0. If we can establish that 0 (y) < 0 for all y > 0; then we will be able to establish that (y) < 0 for all y > 0; which will also ensure that 
where we have used the identity (y) [1 F (y)] = yf (y). Taking the derivative of (y) w.r.t.
here once again we have utilized the identity. Since 0 (y) > 0 from IGFR assumption, 0 (y) < 0 for all y > 0 which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. It is relatively straightforward to show that a policy p that solves the variational inequality problem: …nd p
(same as eqn (22) of the paper) for each …rm f 2 F simultaneously, also solves the joint variational inequality problem: …nd p 2 K such that 0
(same as eqn (25) of the paper). We will now show the converse, i.e., the solution to joint variational inequality problem (14) solves variational inequality problems (13) for each …rm f simultaneously. That is, if p is a solution to joint VI problem (14), then for each …rm f 2 F, p f solves the variational inequality problem (13) with competitors'policies p f given by p f . Own shadow price is computed by solving the equation Proof of Theorem 3. We need to establish that there exists at least one solution of the VI (14). Since any solution of (14) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (per Theorem 2), then that solution will also be a Nash equilibrium of the game. Note that the strategy space of each …rms'pricing decision for each service is a closed interval, hence p is a nonempty, compact and convex set of R jF j jSj (N 1) . Further, r p 1 H 1 r p jF j H jF j T is a continuous mapping from K into R jF j jSj (N 1) . Therefore, invoking Theorem 3.1 of Harker and Pang (1990) we establish that there exists a solution of (14), hence the proof.
0
Therefore, (18) says that at the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium point, the joint pro…t can be further increased if all …rms can collude. But no …rm will take such strategy unilaterally because it has already made the best response given other …rms'pricing decisions. Further, (19) says that if …rms adopt cooperative strategies while they are actually involved in noncooperative equilibrium, they have an incentive to decrease prices to attract more demand. Thus cooperative strategy is clearly not their best response strategy and is not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let us take q 2 K be a minimum of the above …nite dimensional mathematical program and recall that K is convex. Since J(q) is convex and di¤erentiable at q 2 K, a necessary and su¢ cient condition is hrJ (q ) ;i 0 for all q 2 K
further rJ (q ) = ( 1) [p F (p; ; t) q ]
